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Surveys by Ferraro and Taylor (2005) point to abysmal understandings of the 
concept of opportunity cost by US faculty, graduates and undergraduates.   Given 
that opportunity cost is widely believed to be fundamental to economic thinking, 
this empirical evidence raises important teaching and conceptual issues.  One 
implication is that the concept is poorly taught in textbooks and classrooms from 
which it follows that pedagogical remedies are needed.  Three further 
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These implications are that opportunity cost is not a simple concept but a difficult 
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the concept for successful careers as economists.  This paper presents argument 
to support these propositions, and discusses their bearing on approaches to the 
teaching of opportunity cost. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent surveys by Ferraro and Taylor (2005) provide valuable 
empirical information on how well US faculty, graduates and 
undergraduates understand the concept of opportunity cost.  A key 
motivation for their study was the view that graduate programs give 
significantly less attention to economic reasoning skills as compared 
to mathematical mastery or empirical knowledge.1
Based on the belief that the issues raised are deep and fundamental, 
this paper explores the wider implications of the empirical findings.  
Four implications are discussed: 
  While the authors 
chose largely diplomatic language in presenting their results, their 
findings are actually quite alarming and explosive in their 
implications. The data not only generate important questions about the 
teaching of economics, but also about the difficulty, nature and 
importance of the concept of opportunity cost itself.  Although the 
authors discuss the first implication, they do not explore the last three.  
But since these latter issues are strong determinants of the courses of 
action that could be taken to remedy the pedagogical problem, they 
deserve closer attention.   
1.  The concept of opportunity cost is not generally well exposited 
in textbooks or classrooms.  Ferraro and Taylor discuss this 
proposition but do not explicitly extend their analysis to possible 
remedies. 
2.  The concept is not simple and straightforward, but actually quite 
complex.  
3. The concept is not a fundamental concept in contemporary 
orthodox economics, but either a subsidiary or optional one. 
4. A good understanding of the concept is not necessary for a 
successful career as an economist. 
                                                 
1 See Ferraro and Taylor (2005, p.1) which cites, inter alia, Colander and Klamer 
(1987) and Colander (2005). The former found that graduate programs strongly 
emphasised mathematical mastery over (a) knowledge of the economy and (b) 
knowledge of the economic literature, while the  updated later study found that graduate 
programs still appeared ‘highly technical, theoretical and unconcerned with reality’, and 
concluded, inter alia, that core courses should focus more on ‘economic reasoning and 
not technique’ (Colander 2005, pp.181, 198). 
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All the implications are supported by logical argument, regardless of 
the degree to which they are controversial.  They are also relevant to 
clarifying the full choice set of remedies.   
 
2. THE FOUR SURVEYS 
Ferraro and Taylor conducted four surveys, each of which raised 
worrying issues. 
1. The most important survey was of economics PhD holders 
(including faculty) and PhD students attending the 2005 Allied Social 
Sciences Association (ASSA) meeting in Philadelphia.  The sample of 
192 had the following characteristics – about 67% had a PhD and 33% 
were enrolled in PhD programs, approximately 45% were from ‘top-
30 economics departments’ in the US, and about 61% had taught 
introductory economics at tertiary level. Clearly, this was not a trivial 
group – they represented some of ‘the most well-trained economists 
on the planet’ (Ferraro and Taylor 2005, p.7), and they possessed 
considerable teaching experience. Understanding of the concept was 
tested by means of a single multiple choice question as follows: 
You won a free ticket to see an Eric Clapton concert (which has no resale 
value).  Bob Dylan is performing on the same night and is your next-best 
alternative activity.  Tickets to see Dylan cost $40.  On any given day, you 
would be willing to pay up to $50 to see Dylan.  Assume there are no other 
costs of seeing either performer.  Based on this information, what is the 
opportunity cost of seeing Eric Clapton? 
  A. $0  B. $10  C. $40  D. $50. 
The question was adapted from Frank and Bernanke (2001), a well-
regarded US introductory microeconomics text.  As the content of 
such texts has not changed much over time or across authors, it is 
likely that all respondents would have been trained using similar 
materials and exercises.  
Expressed as percentages of respondents, the results of this survey 
were as follows:  
 A. ($0): 25.1% B. ($10): 21.6% C. ($40): 25.6% D. ($50): 27.6%. 
The authors found the results surprising but, given views on the 
centrality of the concept, a more appropriate adjective would be 
astonishing.  Not only was the correct answer ($10) chosen by the 
least number of respondents but, more importantly, the responses 
were spread quite evenly across all the alternatives. As Ferraro and 
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Taylor (2005, p.3) put it: ‘In essence, the answers given to us by well-
trained economists appear to be randomly distributed across possible 
answers’.  Less politely, one could say that the same results could be 
expected, on average, from lay people with no training in economics, 
from monkeys pressing levers, or from machines capable of random 
selection processes.  Reinforcing this conclusion was the further 
finding that, among respondents who had previously taught economics 
principles courses, only 22.5% answered correctly.2
2. The second survey was a smaller test run.  The same question 
was given to 24 faculty colleagues at different institutions, of whom 
only 21% answered correctly. Again, this is an alarming result for a 
group of academics highly trained in economics. Of the 79% who 
answered incorrectly, none reported that they used random guessing, 
from which the authors inferred that these respondents had all applied 
a flawed understanding of the concept in answering the question. 
 
3. The third survey was partly motivated by concerns about wording 
and partly by a colleague’s (odd) remark about the unimportance of 
definitions.  The question was re-phrased without the words 
‘opportunity cost’, the intention being to test whether or not 
economists could ‘identify the relevant trade-offs that guide decision-
making’ in Neoclassical economics.  The new question was the same 
as the original except that the last sentence in the stem became: ‘Based 
on this information, what is the minimum amount (in dollars) you 
would have to value seeing Eric Clapton for you to choose his 
concert?’  The sample was again small, consisting of 34 academic 
economists of whom 44% answered correctly. While a significant 
improvement on the earlier 21.6%, it still represents a minority of the 
respondents.  It also suggests that the re-worded question was easier to 
answer than the question containing the words ‘opportunity cost’, 
which lends further weight to the conclusion that graduates do not 
have a good grasp of this concept. 
4. The fourth survey gave the original question to 358 
undergraduate students during the first week of an introductory 
microeconomics course before the concept of opportunity cost had 
been introduced.  Of the 76% of the class who had previously taken an 
economics course, only 7.4% answered correctly, while of the 
                                                 
2 Less formal surveys by the author presenting the same question to different audiences 
(graduate students, and faculty attending economics conferences) produced similar 
results. 
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remaining 24% of respondents, 17.2% answered correctly.  This 
unhappy difference was found to be statistically significant.  More 
importantly, no statistically significant difference was found between 
the percentage of graduate students who answered correctly in the 
first survey (21.6%) and the percentage of undergraduates without 
prior exposure to economics who answered correctly in this survey 
(17.2%).   
This finding suggests that further study is necessary to correct the 
damage done to economic intuition by previous introductory 
economics courses.  Even so, the rectification generated by at least 3 
years further study of economics is only sufficient to bring the 
likelihood of answering the question correctly up to the level of 
people who have never studied economics before.  This means that 3 
to 7 years devoted to studying economics has no overall influence 
whatsoever on the ability to answer correctly a question about an idea 
that many claim to be one of the most fundamental concepts in the 
subject.  If so, the opportunity cost of studying economics is 
enormous. 
 
3. THE AUTHORS’ COMMENTS ON THE DISMAL 
PERFORMANCE3
The failure of nearly 80% of the respondents in the first survey to 
provide the correct answer has important implications for the teaching 
of economics.  This led Ferraro and Taylor to examine nine top-selling 
tertiary introductory texts with two issues in mind – the definition of 
opportunity cost, and the accompanying discussion used to deepen 
understanding of the concept.  They found that while the definitions 
presented in all nine texts were ‘correct’, they were nevertheless 
‘terse’ and reliant on examples to explain the concept and its 
associated terms.  In addition, most of these examples were very 
simple and lacked sufficient detail to indicate that both benefits and 
costs were involved.  Seven of the nine texts, moreover, did not 
provide the reader with sufficient information to answer the 
‘straightforward’ question in the survey.  Based on this sample of 
textbooks, they concluded that the dismal performance of 
 
                                                 
3  All quotations in the next two sections are from Ferraro and Taylor (2005, pp.9-11). 
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undergraduates with previous exposure to economics was not 
surprising.4
In relation to economic research, while the implications were seen 
as important to a lesser extent, they were also viewed as problematic. 
Their discussion was based on the narrowly focused question: ‘Does it 
matter for economic research if economists cannot identify the 
opportunity cost in a simple contrived question?’  To this question, the 
authors were unable to give a clear answer.   As regards academic 
research, they argued that ‘it apparently does not matter’ – because 
theoretical research ‘rarely requires that an individual calculate an 
opportunity cost in terms of a word problem’, and empirical research 
concentrates more on ‘techniques to make inferences about parameter 
values in models’.  On the other hand, for economists employed in the 
private or public sectors, they argued it obviously does matter.  In this 
context, ‘opportunity costs are the fodder of daily decisions’ and are 
‘the only input that economists are likely to have’.  The implication is 
that such graduates should definitely be able to answer ‘simple, albeit 
contrived, opportunity cost questions’. 
   
The authors’ discussion may be summed up as follows.  First, 
undergraduate teaching is failing to deliver good understandings of 
opportunity cost.  Second, graduate education is likewise deficient 
because it does not revisit the concept and reinforce its relevance to 
real world decision-making.  And finally, these deficiencies create 
doubts about the value of an economics degree.  The fact that 
economics programs cannot instil a deep and intuitive understanding 
of a fundamental idea whose frequent application could do much 
private and public good raises serious questions about the value-added 
by these programs to college curricula.  
 
4. COMMENTS ON THE AUTHORS’ DISCUSSION 
The first comment is that there is a tension between, on the one hand, 
accepting that the concept is straightforward and that textbook 
definitions are correct, and, on the other, criticising the teaching of 
undergraduate and postgraduate economics for not providing adequate 
                                                 
4 At the graduate level, this conclusion can be reached using the three surveys of 
graduate students by Colander and Klamer (1987), Colander (2003) and Colander 
(2005), all of which indicate the central role of graduate education in the reproduction 
of academic economists.  Given the general absence of opportunity cost from graduate 
programs, it is not surprising that faculty and PhD students also demonstrate poor 
understandings. 
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understandings (and even for apparently damaging students’ 
understandings as in the fourth survey).  If the concept really is simple 
or straightforward, then teachers should have no difficulty in 
providing sound intuitive understandings from the outset. To resolve 
this tension, something has to give – abandoning the notion that 
opportunity cost is a simple or straightforward concept seems the right 
move to make. 
A second (related) tension is between saying that all the examined 
definitions were correct, and then criticising them or their amplifying 
discussions for being either imprecise (not specifying the meaning of 
all relevant terms) or incomplete (not providing enough information to 
grasp the concept fully).  An imprecise or incomplete definition (or 
discussion) is certainly not a good definition (or discussion), and 
certainly not a fully correct one either.  At best, an imprecise or 
incomplete definition can only be partially correct, or correct as far as 
it goes which may not be that far.  A good definition will be carefully 
crafted so that its wording is precise, accurate, comprehensive and 
concise.  On a first reading, its full import may not be comprehended 
but, after absorbing accompanying explanations and examples and 
doing set questions, its meaning should become sufficiently clear for it 
always to deliver accurate answers in both simple and complex 
situations.  This is clearly an area where textbooks can be significantly 
improved. Many standard introductory texts provide rather loose 
definitions of opportunity cost, and subsequent texts do not provide 
correctives at higher levels of the curriculum.  If true, the authors’ 
claim (2005, p.9) that principles of economics textbooks ‘are likely to 
be the only economics reference book that most individuals will ever 
read’ is a sad comment on the state of modern economics education.   
Third, there is some unevenness in the treatment of academic 
research economists on the one side and professional economists and 
students on the other. It is viewed as critical for professional 
economists and students to be able to answer such questions correctly, 
but for academic research economists it apparently does not matter.  
This lets these highly trained economists off too lightly, and could 
create an impression of not wanting to offend this group.  If the 
concept is truly straightforward and fundamental to the discipline, 
then economists in all fields should be able to answer a 
straightforward question without difficulty.  
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Fourth, it is misleading to characterise the issue merely as ‘a word 
problem’ with little relevance to theoretical research.  It is actually a 
conceptual problem, and conceptual problems are central to research 
activity. 
Finally, in relation to the incorrect answers, the authors provide 
rationales for why respondents chose $40 or $50 but there is less 
discussion of why some chose $0.  In fact, there is an understandable 
rationale here, for if these respondents were merely recalling the loose 
idea that opportunity cost is what you have to give up to get what you 
want, then they might have reasoned that since the Clapton ticket is 
free, nothing has to be given up to get the more valued alternative.   
Two further remarks bear on the way in which the authors’ findings 
are deployed in the following discussion.  First, any empirical study 
can always be criticised on data collection and processing grounds.  
The criticisms might include the framing of the question, the gathering 
of responses, or the choice of the correct answer, and some of these 
criticisms may well have merit.5  These issues will not be pursued, 
however.  Instead, I shall assume that Ferraro and Taylor have 
presented credible empirical evidence.  In its strong form, this 
amounts to accepting their results as robust while, in its weak form, it 
amounts to saying that whatever imperfections their methods and 
results might possess, the general tenor or direction of their findings is 
correct.  Note, however, that provided other aspects of their procedure 
are accepted, it matters little in what follows whether their chosen 
answer is correct or not.  Since the distribution of responses in the 
main survey is effectively flat, a different right answer will have little 
impact on the arguments.6
Second, it is recognised that there are doubtless variations across 
graduate economists from better to worse understandings of the 
concept, and that there can be simpler opportunity cost questions 
where economics graduates might do far better than lay people.  
However the primary survey focused on the upper levels of the 
profession – PhD graduates and students, many from ‘top’ 
departments, and many with considerable experience in teaching 
principles.  If the ‘cream’ perform dismally in answering a reasonably 
   
                                                 
5 To the extent that they do, they may reinforce the claim that opportunity cost is a 
difficult notion. 
6  The distribution of responses for the other surveys was not given in their paper. 
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straightforward question, there is little hope that those they instruct 
will have better understandings.  
 
5.  IS OPPORTUNITY COST A SIMPLE CONCEPT? 
Almost all textbooks, economics faculty and other economists share 
the view that opportunity cost is a simple, straightforward concept.  In 
textbooks, this is evident from the small amount of space (usually one 
or two pages) devoted to defining and elucidating the idea, from the 
simplicity of the accompanying examples and their (apparently) 
straightforward answers, and from its rare re-visitation at higher levels 
of the subject.  In addition, the general absence of discussion of the 
concept in the academic literature supports the notion of a settled 
Neoclassical consensus.7
Yet the survey results point dramatically to the opposite conclusion 
– namely, that opportunity cost is a difficult concept to understand 
fully, that its application can sometimes be difficult, and that it does 
not remain readily in the memory.  If it were so simple, why would a 
sample of the best-trained economists in the world perform so 
dismally when faced with a straightforward question?   Two main 
alternatives present themselves: 
   
1. The concept really is simple, but highly intelligent and well-
trained people do not understand it properly.  Bad instruction at 
all levels of the curriculum (including the substitution of 
technique for conceptual understanding) creates a fog through 
which intelligent people cannot see, even after years of study 
and teaching. 
2.  The concept is not simple but difficult. The bad instruction lies 
in pretending otherwise, and avoiding the complexities, 
subtleties and underlying assumptions of the concept. 
In my view, the second alternative is more accurate for at least three 
reasons. First, it is most unlikely that very intelligent people will be as 
utterly hopeless at applying a simple concept to straightforward 
situations as the surveys demonstrate.  Second, the idea is an unusual 
one when first encountered, sufficiently different from the lay idea of 
cost that it does not appeal directly to the intuition and is not easily 
                                                 
7 There are exceptions such as those exploring troublesome threshold concepts in 
economics, and those teachers who express their concerns privately or informally rather 
than in print. 
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retained by the mind.  It is only when a person’s intuition becomes 
‘trained’ and ‘practiced’ that the concept becomes ‘simple’.  And 
third, reflection reveals significant conceptual issues and difficulties in 
application (even in the simple examples of the texts) that require far 
greater discussion if deeper and fuller understanding is to be attained.  
 
6. IS OPPORTUNITY COST A FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPT? 
There is also widespread (and seemingly universal) agreement among 
Neoclassical and Austrian economists that opportunity cost is one of 
the most fundamental concepts of economics. Frank (2002, p.460) 
views opportunity cost as ‘utterly central to our understanding of what 
it means to think like an economist’, while Case and Fair (2002, p.2) 
contend that three of the ‘most fundamental concepts’ of economics 
are opportunity cost, marginalism, and efficient markets.  Opportunity 
cost is also central to the voluntary content standards promulgated by 
the Council for Economic Education (1997) and advocated for 
principles courses by Hansen et al (2002).  In similar vein, Ferraro and 
Taylor (2005, pp.1,11) make the claims that ‘One of the most 
important contributions economics has to offer as a discipline is the 
understanding of opportunity cost and how to apply this concept to all 
forms of decision making’, that the concept is ‘arguably the most 
fundamental concept in economic reasoning’, and that it is ‘one of the 
most fundamental ideas that the discipline has to offer…whose 
frequent application could do the most good in people’s private and 
public lives’.  The implications are that one cannot grasp economic 
thinking without grasping opportunity cost, and that the concept has a 
large role to play in improving everyones’ lives. 
But what does it mean for a concept to be fundamental?  It must 
mean that the concept is an essential part of the conceptual framework 
of a discipline, that it is a referent in all or most analyses and 
applications, and that it forms an enduring idea informing, guiding and 
framing all or most issues in the discipline at all levels.  As examples, 
take physics where force and energy are fundamental concepts, 
chemistry where molecules are central, biology where cells and genes 
are fundamental, or Marxism where social class is a fundamental 
category.  It is impossible to converse meaningfully in these 
disciplines on any major question or issue without reference to these 
concepts; they constantly permeate all discourse, figure in all levels of 
instruction, and have central roles in research. 
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Can the same be said of opportunity cost?  Not at all.  Typically, in 
principles textbooks it is given a relatively brief introduction in one of 
the opening chapters, after which it is applied to topics such as 
production possibility frontiers, cost curves and comparative 
advantage.  In intermediate texts, it is only sporadically encountered, 
and in advanced texts it disappears altogether.  In other words, as the 
edifice of economic theory is built up and elaborated, references to 
opportunity cost rapidly decline to zero. A great deal of higher level 
research, moreover, is conducted with little or no mention of this 
putatively fundamental concept.  This contrasts strongly with the role 
of fundamental concepts in almost every other discipline, for such 
concepts remain crucial to discourses across textbooks, teaching, 
research and practice.8
We now face a fork in the road. Either economics is a peculiar and 
unique subject in which discussion in many areas can proceed 
independently of one of its fundamental concepts.  Or the concept of 
opportunity cost is not a fundamental economic concept, and is thus 
either a subordinate or an optional one.  In my view, the second 
alternative is more plausible, partly for the above reasons and partly 
because of the following argument.  In Neoclassical economics, one 
truly fundamental concept (in the above sense) is the rational, self-
interested maximising agent, the primary aim of which is to identify 
and select, out of all alternatives, that course of action which yields 
the highest net benefit or rate of return.  In this context, opportunity 
cost does not appear to have any necessary role in decision-making.  
Performed properly, one can arrive at exactly the same optimal 
decision, either on the basis of explicit costs alone, or on the more 
standard procedure of combining explicit costs and implicit (or 
opportunity) costs.  If this is correct, the inclusion of opportunity cost 
then becomes a matter of preference as to how one teaches orthodox 
choice theory – it can be presented using opportunity cost, or it can be 
presented without reference to this concept at all.
  
9
Clearly, this is not to suggest that costs are unimportant in decision-
making.  Far from it, they are essential. But it is to suggest that costs 
 
                                                 
8  Another indication of the low profile of opportunity cost is given by the 4,000 pages 
of the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Eatwell et al 1998).  Its index only gives 
three page references to opportunity cost which is fewer than those given to 
‘congestion’, ‘entropy’ and ‘usury’, for example. 
9  Note that while trade-offs are central to choice and substitution, trade-offs are not 
identical to opportunity costs. 
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can be handled perfectly well in decision making without reference to 
the special notion of opportunity cost.  The standard insistence upon 
the necessity of opportunity cost may be driven by non-technical, even 
ideological, reasons.   
However, if the above demotion is resisted and opportunity cost 
declared to be fundamental, logic requires at least two responses.  
First, we need a definition of a fundamental concept and its 
distinguishing characteristics which is significantly different from that 
given above.  Second, we need an explanation of why this definition 
provides a plausible, general account applicable to all disciplines 
(including Neoclassical economics) or, alternatively, of why 
Neoclassicism should be an exception from that which applies in other 
disciplines.  Both would appear to be difficult tasks. 
 
7.   IS OPPORTUNITY COST NECESSARY FOR A 
SUCCESSFUL CAREER AS AN ECONOMIST? 
The answer to this question has to be a resounding affirmative from a 
Neoclassical perspective which regards the concept as fundamental.  
This is because economists who do not correctly identify true costs 
because of flawed understandings will make mistakes in decisions, 
policy-making and advice.  These mistakes will lead to inferior or 
disastrous outcomes which will lead to individuals being penalised or 
fired. The ‘test of the market’ – the normal workings of competition – 
and the ‘efficiency principle’ – the idea that arrangements that persist 
are efficient – will ensure that only the competent succeed.10   As 
Stigler (1992, p.459) put it, ‘institutions and practices found wanting 
will not survive in a world of rational people’.  And for Case and Fair 
(2002), ‘If your study of economics is successful, you will use 
[opportunity cost] every day in making decisions’.11
But again reality seems to declare otherwise.  If highly trained 
academics have a poor understanding of the concept, then it is almost 
certain that those they train will also have poor (or even poorer) 
understandings.  Professional economists were not separately 
surveyed by Ferraro and Taylor but it is reasonable to believe that they 
would also demonstrate a dismal performance in answering the 
question.  However, we do not actually see large scale firings of 
professional economists, nor are they highly unsuccessful in their 
 
                                                 
10  On the efficiency principle, see Milgrom and Roberts (1992, pp.24-5, 598). 
11  Cited by Ferraro and Taylor (2005, p.11). 
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careers, nor are there calls from outside academia to emphasise 
opportunity cost in the training of graduates. It can thus be concluded 
that, to be useful and successful, this group does not need good 
understandings of a putatively fundamental concept belonging to the 
essence of the subject they are practising.  Since current educational 
practices have not changed for a considerable period, these practices 
must, on Neoclassical logic, be efficient. Hence a good understanding 
of opportunity cost is not required.  This conclusion conflicts with the 
previous claim that opportunity cost is fundamental to being 
successful, so that Neoclassicism is caught on the horns of a dilemma. 
Such a situation could not possibly arise in the case of physicists or 
engineers.  If they lacked a good grasp of force or energy, they would 
be quickly shown the door – spacecraft and bridges must perform well 
with minimal probabilities of failure. That successful careers exist for 
economists with poor understandings of opportunity cost is a strong 
case for believing that this is not a fundamental concept necessary for 
the successful practice of economics. 
 
8. IS OPPORTUNITY COST AN UNDISPUTED CONCEPT? 
It is worth noting that the standard Neoclassical treatment of the 
concept is not without its critics.  Buchanan (1998, pp.719-20), 
writing from an Austrian perspective, emphasizes that opportunity 
cost is an entirely subjective notion that cannot be objectified or 
measured by anyone external to the chooser and thus cannot be readily 
translated into non-subjective dimensions such as money.  This 
conflicts with typical textbook examples which put dollar values on 
the opportunity cost of going to college or of becoming a basketball 
player, and sits uncomfortably with including opportunity cost in 
dollar values of firms’ costs.  Buchanan further argues that the logic of 
setting price equal to marginal cost in non-market settings (a staple of 
most textbooks) is ‘a tissue of confusion based on a misunderstanding 
of opportunity cost’.   
It is noteworthy that Buchanan (and anyone else adopting Austrian 
subjectivism) would not be able to answer the Clapton-Dylan question 
because the alternatives do not include the correct answer.  The 
correct answer would not be a dollar amount, but the subjective utility 
that the dollar amount represents to the individual making the choice, 
this being something that necessarily varies across individuals. So 
perhaps the question is not so straightforward after all.  While 
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apparently straightforward in a Neoclassical framework,12
 
 it is 
inadequately specified in an Austrian framework. 
9.  WHERE TO FROM HERE? 
There would, I think, be fairly widespread agreement that opportunity 
cost is currently not well taught and understood, and that this state of 
affairs has persisted for at least several decades. The key question is 
what should be done about it. As always, rational decisions are 
assisted by consideration of the full choice set.  In this context, three 
main alternatives appear available.  Opportunity cost is either (i) 
necessary and fundamental, or (ii) necessary but subsidiary, or (iii) 
optional and dispensable.   
For those who view it as necessary and fundamental, the situation is 
extremely serious and needs to be addressed urgently by significant 
changes in teaching practices. Exactly what changes are appropriate is 
a matter for discussion. Frank (2005) would presumably renovate the 
curriculum by moving away from the common structure of 
encyclopaedic introductory courses followed by advanced formalised 
courses, for he sees this type of training as the main reason why both 
students and professors finish up with only tenuous grasps of the 
concept.  But whatever one’s diagnosis, one should not automatically 
jump to the conclusion that merely expanding the time and examples 
given to opportunity cost in introductory courses will be sufficient.  
Writers who see opportunity cost as a ‘threshold concept’, such as 
Davies and Mangan (2007, p.724), have argued that this, on its own, 
may actually hinder a full understanding of the concept because it fails 
to develop its alleged integrative properties across the full curriculum. 
However, for those who do not regard the concept as necessary and 
fundamental, or who are at least undecided on the issue, other 
remedies can be considered.  Here the key question is the extent to 
which Neoclassical theory can be taught without reference to 
opportunity cost.  Is it possible merely to reduce its role, or is it 
possible to eliminate it entirely?  If one views the concept as necessary 
but subsidiary, then improved exposition and teaching are desirable 
but not as urgent.  But if Neoclassical decision theory can be recast 
without deploying opportunity cost at all, then the concept becomes 
optional rather than necessary, which means that a troublesome 
concept can be avoided by both learners and teachers.  Given that this 
                                                 
12  Frank (2005) declares that ‘the unambiguously correct answer to the question is $10’. 
Opportunity Cost     35 
 
might be true and that large potential payoffs are involved, the 





Ferraro and Taylor have performed valuable service in raising the 
issue of how well opportunity cost is understood by faculty, graduates 
and economics students, and in generating unique empirical 
information about the depth of these understandings.  If the concept 
really is simple, fundamental and necessary, the findings are 
depressing and reflect poorly on the competencies imparted to 
graduates in the area of economic reasoning and intuition.  From this 
perspective, there is much to be done in the teaching arena to address 
the problem, but, given the slowness of textbooks and institutions to 
change, it is doubtful that major progress will be seen in the short 
term.14
However, an alternative perspective has been advanced that casts 
the concept in a different light. It has been suggested that opportunity 
cost is a difficult concept and not a simple one, that it is not a 
fundamental concept but either a subsidiary or optional one, and that a 
deep understanding of the concept is not necessary for a successful 
career in economics.  Should these propositions be resisted, reason 
calls for argued rebuttal rather than assertive or dismissive responses.  
We need to be shown why the concept is actually simple despite the 
dismal performance of graduates, why it is truly fundamental even 
though its treatment and use is so vastly different from fundamental 
concepts in other disciplines, and why those with such a poor 
understanding of the concept can nevertheless have successful careers 
when careers in other disciplines would collapse in the absence of a 
sufficient understanding of fundamental concepts.  
  If opportunity cost is one of the economist’s most important 
gifts to the world, capable of doing much good in people’s private and 
public lives, then the opportunity cost of inaction is massive. 
The alternative perspective adds two further options to the choice 
set, both of which alter the task facing textbook writers and lecturers.  
The milder one is that opportunity cost is a necessary but subsidiary 
concept, in which case improvements in teaching are still needed but 
are less critical.  The more radical one is that opportunity cost is an 
                                                 
13  This topic will be analysed in detail in a later paper. 
14  On the slowness of textbooks to change significantly, see Colander (2004). 
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optional and dispensable concept within Neoclassical pedagogy; that 
is to say, one can teach the subject with or without this concept 
depending on one’s preferences, there being no unique approach to 
this issue in relation to optimal decision making.  If the latter view can 
be sustained, the short term costs of revisions to the curriculum would 
be amply repaid by the large benefits to learners and teachers in the 
short, medium and long terms.  However, before any revision of 
textbooks and teaching practices occurs, the most appropriate course 
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